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INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, the Federal Circuit delivered nine opinions addressing 
substantive trademark issues.1  The court also addressed, albeit 
briefly, procedural issues in two cases.2  For the most part, the 2002 
cases are unremarkable and present no grand departures from prior 
precedent.  Rather, the cases represent continued application and 
modest refinement of prior Federal Circuit law. 
The substantive issues addressed by the Federal Circuit in 2002 
include the likelihood of confusion,3 functionality,4 priority of use,5 
and descriptiveness.6  The court considered two procedural issues; 
                                                          
 1. See Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (affirming the District Court’s finding of likelihood of confusion between 
the marks at issue); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board (“the Board”) erred in determining that Kappa’s prior use created 
proprietary rights); Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board erred by 
concluding that there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue); 
Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that Transclean failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the nondescriptive usage of its marks to prevent summary 
judgment in its trademark infringement action); In re Galbreath, No. 01-1620, 2002 
U.S. App. LEXIS 9702 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2002) (concluding that the trademark 
application at issue was merely descriptive of a product, and therefore was properly 
denied); PC Club v. Primex Techs., No. 01-1220, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4892 (Fed. 
Cir. Mar. 22, 2002) (holding that the Board correctly concluded there was little 
likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue); Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. v. 
Minuteman Int’l, Inc., No. 01-1555, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4381 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 
2002) (affirming the Board’s decision to deny a trademark for domestic and 
industrial vacuum cleaners based on likelihood of confusion); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 
Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(reversing the Board’s decision that the marks at issue were not sufficiently related to 
support a finding of likelihood of confusion); Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 
F.3d 1268, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that applicant’s 
cross-sectional designs were de jure functional, and therefore not subject to 
trademark protection). 
 2. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (remanding the case for a determination of the proper choice of law 
with respect to the trademark infringement issues); Boyle v. Barclays Global 
Investors, N.A., No. 02-1357, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24098 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2002) 
(dismissing Boyle’s appeal from a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
as untimely). 
 3. See infra Part I.A (summarizing the five Federal Circuit cases delivered in 2002 
that focused on the issue of likelihood of confusion). 
 4. See infra Part I.B (analyzing the 2002 Federal Circuit case that addressed the 
trademarking of functional designs). 
 5. See infra Part I.C (detailing the 2002 Federal Circuit case that dealt with the 
issue of the priority of use of a trademark). 
 6. See infra Part I.D (summarizing the two Federal Circuit cases issued in 2002 
that examined the issue of trademarks for descriptions of goods and services). 
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choice of law7 and timeliness of appeal.8  Of the eight trademark cases 
that reached the Federal Circuit from the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board (“the Board”)9 in 2002, the Federal Circuit reversed the 
Board three times,10 affirmed the Board on four occasions,11 and 
dismissed the appeal in another.12  Addressing appeals from 
trademark decisions of lower federal courts in 2002, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the lower court holding on the trademark claims in 
one case,13 reversed in one case,14 and affirmed in part and reversed 
in part in another.15 
                                                          
 7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the 2002 Federal Circuit decision that 
concerned the determination of whether state or federal law applies to a particular 
trademark infringement suit). 
 8. See infra Part II.B (summarizing the Federal Circuit decision delivered in 
2002 that addressed the timeliness of a notice of appeal). 
 9. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review appeals from the Board 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (2000). 
 10. See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing the Board’s holding that Kappa’s prior use 
created proprietary rights); Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing the Board’s conclusion that there 
was no likelihood of confusion between the marks in this suit); Hewlett-Packard Co. 
v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(reversing the Board’s conclusion that the parties’ marks were not sufficiently related 
to support a finding of likelihood of confusion). 
 11. See Galbreath, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9702, at *1 (affirming the Board’s refusal 
to register a trademark because it was merely descriptive of the product); PC Club, 
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4982, at *1 (affirming the Board’s conclusion that there was 
little likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue in this action); Royal 
Appliance Mfg. Co. v. Minuteman Int’l, Inc., No. 01-1555, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 
4381, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2002) (affirming the Board’s denial to issue a 
trademark for domestic and industrial vacuum cleaners based on likelihood of 
confusion); Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1422 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming the Board’s refusal to register Valu’s designs 
because they were de jure functional). 
 12. See Boyle v. Barclays Global Investors, N.A., No. 02-1357, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 24098, at *1  (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2002) (dismissing Boyle’s appeal for failure to 
file a timely notice of appeal). 
 13. See Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendant on the trademark claims because Transclean failed 
to present a relevant genuine issue of material fact). 
 14. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (reversing the district court and remanding for a determination of 
the proper choice of law). 
 15. See Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s finding of likelihood of confusion, but 
reversing the lower court’s treatment of damages). 
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I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Likelihood of Confusion 
In March 2002 alone, the Federal Circuit issued three opinions, 
only one of which was published, addressing the likelihood of 
confusion posed by the marks at issue.16  The court turned to the 
issue twice more during the year, in June17 and September.18 
1. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc. 
The first of the March 2002 trilogy of likelihood of confusion cases 
featured the return of Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc.,19 a 
dispute that previously reached the Federal Circuit in 2000.20  This 
case arose in connection with Hewlett-Packard Company’s (“HP”) 
opposition to Packard Press, Inc.’s (“Packard Press”) application to 
register, on an intent-to-use basis, the mark PACKARD 
TECHNOLOGIES “for data and information processing, electronic 
transmission of data and documents via computer terminals, and 
electronic transmission of messages and data.”21  Packard Press also 
sought registration of the mark for “data and digital information 
(media duplication of) and conversion from one media form to 
another media (document data transfer and physical).”22 
Packard Press is a commercial printer specializing in the legal, 
municipal, and financial industry market.23  Prior to filing the intent-
to-use application at issue, Packard Press obtained federal trademark 
registrations of two similar marks for use in connection with printing 
services.24 
HP owns multiple federal trademark registrations for the marks 
HEWLETT PACKARD for use in connection with such goods as 
“computers, data processing and data storage systems, data 
acquisition systems, printers and printer accessories, facsimile 
machines, computer software, and publications regarding data 
                                                          
 16. See Galbreath, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9702, at *1; PC Club, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 4982, at *1; Royal Appliance, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4381, at *1; Valu Eng’g,  278 
F.3d at 1268, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1422. 
 17. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 18. Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 19. 281 F.3d 1261, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 20. Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 21. Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1264, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 22. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002 (internal quotations omitted). 
 23. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 24. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
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processing products.”25  HP’s registrations also cover services 
including “consulting services for data processing products, rental 
and leasing services for data processing equipment, maintenance and 
repair of data processing equipment, and retail mail and telephone 
order services for data processing products.”26  HP filed an opposition 
to the registration of the PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES mark on the 
ground that the applied-for mark was confusingly similar to thirteen 
of HP’s previously registered HEWLETT PACKARD marks.27 
Initially, the Board sustained HP’s opposition, finding that the 
PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES mark created a likelihood of confusion 
with HP’s marks.28  However, on September 25, 2000, the Federal 
Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s decision, holding that the 
Board incorrectly dissected the marks at issue and failed to clarify, in 
the record, whether it applied a proper legal test to assess the 
relatedness of the parties’ respective goods and services.29  On 
remand, the Board found no likelihood of confusion between the 
PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES mark and the HEWLETT PACKARD 
marks, and dismissed HP’s opposition.30  The Federal Circuit, on 
March 1, 2002, reversed the Board’s subsequent determination that 
there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks.31 
To assess whether an applied-for mark is likely to cause confusion 
with a previously registered mark, the Federal Circuit considers a 
series of factors, usually referred to as the “DuPont” factors, that were 
set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.32  The Federal Circuit’s 
analysis of Packard Press’s PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES mark 
                                                          
 25. Id. at 1263-64, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 26. Id. at 1264, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 27. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 28. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 29. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 30. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 31. Id. at 1268, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 32. 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  The thirteen 
DuPont factors are:  (1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties 
as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; (2) the similarity 
or dissimilarity and nature of the goods described in the application or registration 
of the mark, or in connection with which a prior mark is in use; (3) the similarity or 
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels; (4) the conditions 
under which and the buyers to whom sales are made; (5) the fame of the prior mark; 
(6) the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) the nature 
and extent of any actual confusion; (8) the length of time during and the conditions 
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; 
(9) the variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used; (10) the market interface 
between applicant and the owner of a prior mark; (11) the extent to which applicant 
has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; (12) the extent of 
potential confusion; and (13) any other established fact probative of the effect of 
use.  Id. at 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 567. 
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focussed on two of these factors; namely, the similarity or dissimilarity 
of the marks in their entireties, and the similarities or dissimilarities 
and nature of the goods or services as described in the parties’ 
application and registrations.33 
Addressing the DuPont factors, the court indicated that “the 
‘similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties’ is a 
predominant inquiry.”34  Answering this inquiry, the court agreed 
with the Board’s finding that the similarities in the marks at issue 
outweighed the differences.35  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that although some differences existed in the appearance and 
pronunciation of the marks, “the marks convey a similar commercial 
impression.”36 
The court noted the obvious differences between the marks at 
issue.  Specifically, in HP’s mark, the term “Packard” is “the second 
word in a mark consisting of two separate words” while in Packard 
Press’s mark it is “the first word.”37  Also, the word “Hewlett,” which is 
the first word in HP’s mark, does not appear in Packard Press’s 
mark.38  Lastly, the word “Technologies” does not appear in HP’s 
mark.39  Notwithstanding those differences, the court agreed with the 
Board’s conclusion that “the dominant portion of Packard Press’s 
mark is identical to a prominent portion of HP’s HEWLETT 
PACKARD marks.”40  Moreover, the court found that the similarities 
of the marks were enhanced by HP’s significant involvement in 
technology, increasing the likelihood that “consumers familiar with 
the HEWLETT PACKARD marks and HP’s technology-based goods 
and services would . . . associate the PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES 
mark in some way with HP.”41 
Turning to the second DuPont factor at issue, the similarity or 
dissimilarity and nature of the parties’ goods and services, the court 
disagreed with the Board’s conclusion that the goods and services at 
issue were not related enough to support a finding of likelihood of 
confusion.42  The Board based its conclusion on HP’s failure to 
present evidence of relatedness beyond the descriptions appearing in 
                                                          
 33. Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1265-68, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-05. 
 34. Id. at 1265, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361, 
177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567). 
 35. Id. at 1266-67, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04. 
 36. Id. at 1266, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 37. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003. 
 38. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04. 
 39. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 40. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 41. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 42. Id. at 1267-68, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004-05. 
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the relevant application and registrations.43  However, the Federal 
Circuit took issue with the Board’s determination that HP needed to 
provide further evidence of relatedness, holding that the Board 
“erred when it declined to compare the services described in Packard 
Press’s application with the goods and services described in HP’s 
registration.”44 
Rather, the court observed that HP’s registrations included goods 
and services that related closely to the services broadly described in 
Packard Press’s application for the PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES 
mark.45 Based on that evidence, the court concluded that “consumers 
may well find the goods and services of the parties related enough to 
make confusion likely,” and thus “[s]ubstantial evidence does not 
support the Board’s finding that the goods and services are not 
sufficiently related to maintain a finding of a likelihood of 
confusion.”46 
Having previously noted that “[t]he likelihood of confusion 
analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there is evidence of 
record but ‘may focus . . . on dispositive factors such as similarity of 
the marks and relatedness of the goods,’”47 the Federal Circuit held 
that “[a]s a matter of law, there is a likelihood of confusion between 
the marks.”48 
2. Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co. v. Minuteman International, 
Inc. 
Just six days after publishing its opinion in Hewlett-Packard, the 
Federal Circuit issued an unpublished decision addressing the issue 
of likelihood of confusion in Royal Appliance Manufacturing Co. v. 
Minuteman International, Inc.49  In this case, the court affirmed the 
Board’s decision to sustain an opposition based on a finding of 
likelihood of confusion.50 
In Royal Appliance, the Federal Circuit addressed the same two 
DuPont factors that were addressed in Hewlett-Packard, as well as a 
third DuPont factor, the “similarity or dissimilarity of established, 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 1267, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 44. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 45. Id. at 1268, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 46. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 47. Id. at 1265, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003 (quoting Han Beauty, Inc. v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)). 
 48. Id.  at 1268, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 49. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co. v. Minuteman Int’l, Inc., No. 01-1555, 2002 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 4381, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 7, 2002). 
 50. Id. at *1. 
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likely to continue, trade channels.”51  At issue was an intent-to-use 
application filed in November 1994 by Royal Appliance 
Manufacturing Company (“Royal”), seeking to register the mark MVP 
for use in connection with “electrical vacuum cleaners for both 
domestic and industrial use.”52 
Minuteman International Inc. (“Minuteman”) is a manufacturer of 
commercial and industrial vacuum cleaners, which have been 
marketed under the mark MPV since October 1994.53  On November 
21, 1995, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
issued a registration for the MPV mark to Minuteman.54  Following 
publication of Royal’s application, Minuteman filed an opposition 
alleging that Royal’s MVP mark was confusingly similar to its own 
MPV mark.55  The Board sustained Minuteman’s opposition.56 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Royal argued, inter alia, that the 
overall commercial impressions of MPV and MVP are not 
substantially similar, that the Board misapplied the factor addressing 
similarity or dissimilarity of the goods, and that the channels of trade 
for its products and those of Minuteman do not overlap.57  The 
Federal Circuit rejected all of Royal’s arguments.58 
Addressing Royal’s first argument, the court reiterated the 
principle that “[a] determination of similarity or dissimilarity under 
DuPont requires an examination of the marks in their entirety; the 
Board, and [the Federal Circuit], must consider all relevant factors 
pertaining to the marks’ appearance, sound and connotation.”59  
Royal had asserted that the letters “MVP” are a common acronym for 
“most valuable player” and, thus, in its view, the Board should not 
have compared MVP and MPV “as two unpronounceable letter 
combinations that are inherently difficult to remember.”60  Rather, 
Royal contended, “the Board should have analyzed MVP as a mark 
that evokes an attribute of [Royal’s] goods.”61  Rejecting Royal’s 
argument, the court observed that Royal focused solely on the mark’s 
                                                          
 51. Id. at *4 (quoting In re E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 
177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 52. Id. at *1 (internal quotations omitted). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. (sustaining the opposition because of the likelihood of confusion 
between the opposing marks). 
 57. Id. at *3-5. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at *3. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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connotation, but ignored the obvious similarities between the marks’ 
appearance and sound.62 
Royal’s challenge to the Board’s application of the DuPont factor 
addressing similarity or dissimilarity of the goods was based on the 
Board’s refusal to permit Royal to modify its description of goods in 
the application at issue.63  More than a month after Minuteman’s 
testimony period in the opposition proceeding had closed, Royal 
filed a motion to modify its identification of goods from “‘electrical 
vacuum cleaners for both domestic and industrial use’” to “‘electrical 
vacuum cleaners for domestic use.’”64  The Board denied Royal’s 
motion.65  Subsequently, the Federal Circuit rejected Royal’s 
challenge to that denial, declaring that “[t]he Board’s decision to 
deny [Royal’s] motion is not reviewable by the court.”66  Because the 
“law is clear that, in determining likelihood of confusion, the Board 
must look to the description of the goods contained in the opposer’s 
registration and the applicant’s application rather than to the goods’ 
actual use,”67 once the Board’s refusal to amend Royal’s description of 
goods was sustained, the court easily sustained the Board’s finding 
that the parties’ goods overlapped.68 
The court similarly rejected Royal’s challenge to the Board’s 
analysis of the parties’ channels of trade.69  As was true with respect to 
the analysis of the previous DuPont factor, the contents of the parties’ 
respective application and registration was significant to the analysis 
of the channels of trade.  The court noted that, “[i]t is well settled 
that absent restrictions in the application and registration, goods and 
services are presumed to travel in all appropriate trade channels to all 
potential purchasers of such goods.”70  The court affirmed the 
Board’s finding that the channels of trade for the parties’ goods 
overlapped because janitorial supply stores sold both domestic and 
                                                          
 62. See id. (noting that “the two marks consist of the same three letters, and they 
both begin with an ‘M.’  Moreover, the last two letters in Royals’s mark, ‘VP,’ are a 
transposition of the remaining letters in Minuteman’s ‘PV,’ and the marks sound 
alike when said aloud.”). 
 63. Id. at *4. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  The court stated that “the question of whether the board abused its 
discretion in denying such a motion, filed after the testimony period, is a matter to 
be determined by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, not by this court.”  
Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. (recognizing that the identification of goods and services will be 
determinative of the question of registrability of the mark, regardless of revelations 
in the record). 
 69. Id. at *5. 
 70. Id. at *5 n.1. 
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commercial vacuum cleaners.71  Thus, having rejected all of Royal’s 
arguments, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding of a 
likelihood of confusion. 
3. PC Club v. Primex Technologies, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit issued another unpublished decision 
addressing the likelihood of confusion on March 22, 2002 in PC Club 
v. Primex Technologies, Inc.72  At issue in PC Club were two applications 
made by Primex Technologies, Inc. (“Primex”) to register the marks 
EMPOWER, and EMPOWER and design, for use in connection with 
“electrical power supplies to provide an in-seat power supply in 
transportation vehicles, namely, aircraft, automobiles, boats, buses, 
trains and vans.”73  Essentially, Primex’s product supplies a source of 
power for airline passengers’ laptop computers.74   
PC Club is a manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer of computers, 
computer parts, and peripherals that PC Club marketed under the 
trademark ENPOWER.75  PC Club’s ENPOWER mark is registered for 
use in connection with computers and various computer 
peripherals.76  Based on that registration, PC Club filed oppositions to 
each of Primex’s applications on the ground that Primex’s 
EMPOWER mark created a likelihood of confusion with PC Club’s 
ENPOWER mark.77  The Board dismissed PC Club’s opposition, 
finding that any likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks 
was de minimis.78 
In affirming the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit addressed 
three of the DuPont factors:  the relatedness of the parties’ goods, the 
channels of trade, and the conditions under which and to whom sales 
are made.79  Addressing the relatedness of the parties’ goods, the 
court instructed that “the question that must be considered is 
whether the goods are so related that they are likely to be connected 
in the mind of a prospective purchaser.”80  The Board concluded, and 
the Federal Circuit agreed, that the parties’ products were not 
                                                          
 71. Id. at *5. 
 72. 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4982, at *1. 
 73. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. (quoting In re E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 80. Id. at *2. 
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competitive with each other.81  The court adopted the Board’s 
conclusion that “PC Club and Primex sell very different products 
under their respective marks.  Primex sells a system that provides 
airlines passengers a source of power for their laptop computers.  PC 
Club, on the other hand, sells computers, computer parts and 
peripherals.”82  While it seems less than clear, based on this 
explanation provided by the court, that no relationship exists 
between the parties’ goods,83 the court concluded that “substantial 
evidence supports the Board’s decision on this issue.”84 
Next, the court examined the channels of trade for the parties’ 
products.  The Board determined that “there was a dissimilarity in 
the channels of trade because PC Club sells its products at wholesale 
or retail to average consumers, whereas Primex’s system is not the 
type of item that would be sold at retail.”85  The court agreed that 
“there is not more than a theoretical possibility that Primex’s goods 
would be purchased by general consumers at retail.”86 
The last DuPont factor considered by the court in PC Club was the 
factor encompassing the conditions under which and buyers to whom 
sales are made.  The court explained that the risk of likelihood of 
confusion increases when products are inexpensive and the 
consumer uses less care in his/her purchase.87  In this case, the court 
found that, “[g]iven the amount of money it costs to install Primex’s 
EMPOWER system, it is clear that a purchaser of Primex’s system will 
exercise, at a minimum, some degree of care,” and “[t]his is also true 
of PC Club’s product.”88 Thus, this factor militated against a finding 
of a likelihood of confusion.  Viewing all of the issues before it, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of PC Club’s 
oppositions.89 
4. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc. 
The Federal Circuit returned to the issue of likelihood of 
confusion on June 14, 2002, in Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Products, Inc.90  
                                                          
 81. Id. at *3. 
 82. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 83. For example, it does not seem far-fetched that the trademark of a 
manufacturer of computers and peripherals would appear in connection with a 
power source designed specifically to power those devices.   
 84. PC Club, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4982, at *1. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at *4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 293 F.3d 1367, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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This case, in which the court discussed four of the DuPont factors,91 
resulted in the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the Board’s decision to 
dismiss an opposition to an application for a trademark registration.92 
At issue in Bose was an application filed by QSC Audio Products, 
Inc. (“QSC”) to register the mark POWERWAVE for use in 
connection with “[e]lectronic audio and video signal processing 
equipment, namely, amplifiers and power amplifiers.”93 Bose 
Corporation (“Bose”), which owned the marks ACOUSTIC WAVE 
and WAVE, opposed that application.94  Bose’s ACOUSTIC WAVE 
mark was registered for use in connection with “loudspeaker systems 
and music systems consisting of a loudspeaker system and amplifier 
and at least one of a radio tuner, compact disc player and audio tape 
cassette player.”95  The Bose WAVE mark was registered “for goods 
including radios, clock radios, audio tape recorders and players, 
portable radio and cassette recorder combinations, compact stereo 
systems and portable compact disc players.”96 
The Board dismissed Bose’s opposition, finding that there was no 
likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks.97  Although it 
found commonality between the channels of trade for the parties’ 
products, the Board concluded that Bose’s marks were not famous, 
the parties’ goods were not sufficiently related, and the marks 
themselves were distinctly dissimilar.98  Addressing the Board’s 
decision on appeal, the court indicated that if fame of a mark exists, 
“it plays a dominant role in the process of balancing the DuPont 
factors.”99  The court concluded that the Bose marks ACOUSTIC 
WAVE and WAVE deserved protection because they are famous.100  
Before reaching that conclusion, however, the court engaged in a 
lengthy and informative discussion of this fame factor. 
First, the court considered the evidence presented by Bose to 
demonstrate the fame of its marks.  Bose sought to prove the fame of 
                                                          
 91. The four factors discussed in Bose are:  (i) fame of the opposer’s mark or 
marks; (ii) similarity or relatedness of the goods; (iii) commonality of the channels of 
trade; and (iv) comparison of the marks.  Id. at 1370, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305 
(quoting In re E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
 92. Id. at 1378, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311-12. 
 93. Id. at 1369, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (internal quotations omitted). 
 94. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 95. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (internal quotations omitted). 
 96. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 97. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 98. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 99. Id. at 1371, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1305 (quoting Recot Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 
1322, 1327, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1894, 1894 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 100. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
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its marks by presenting evidence of sales volume and cost of 
advertising for its products.101  Although the volume demonstrated by 
Bose appeared to be substantial,102 the Board had “discounted the 
sales and advertising evidence for the product marks, standing alone, 
because those indicia of fame had not been placed in any context 
‘from which to determine how substantial the figures are for these 
types of products.’”103   
Considering the issue, the court examined its own past decisions 
and instructed that: 
Direct evidence of fame, for example from widespread consumer 
polls, rarely appears in contests over likelihood of confusion.  
Instead, our cases teach that the fame of a mark may be measured 
indirectly, among other things, by the volume of sales and 
advertising expenditures of the goods traveling under the mark 
and by the length of time those indicia of commercial awareness 
have been evident. . . .  [W]e have consistently accepted statistics of 
sales and advertising as indicia of fame:  when the numbers are 
large, we have tended to accept them without any further 
supporting proof.104 
Given its existing precedents on the issue, the court was unwilling to 
uphold the Board’s conclusion that Bose’s marks lacked the requisite 
fame simply because “Bose had not introduced any direct evidence of 
consumer recognition of the fame of the marks.”105   
 Although the Federal Circuit rejected the Board’s conclusion in 
this case, the court seemed sympathetic to the Board’s analysis, giving 
the impression that perhaps mere sales and advertising figures, which 
for so long have been relied upon to demonstrate fame, might not be 
sufficient in the future.106  For example, the court indicated with 
respect to consumer surveys that “such direct evidence of consumer 
awareness of products and the marks they bear is preferable to 
indirect evidence of consumer recognition, from which inferences 
necessarily have to be drawn.”107  Similarly, the court observed that:   
[r]aw numbers of product sales and advertising expenses may have 
sufficed in the past to prove fame of a mark, but raw numbers in 
                                                          
 101. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 102. See id. at 1372-73, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306 (highlighting the seventeen 
years of use on the products covered by the mark, with “annual sales of over $50 
million . . . [and] more than $5 million annually to advertise” for ACOUSTIC WAVE; 
and the “current annual sales of $100 million . . . [with] [c]urrent annual advertising 
expenses over $30 million” for WAVE). 
 103. Id. at 1374, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308. 
 104. Id. at 1371, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 105. Id. at 1373, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308. 
 106. Id. at 1375, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 107. Id. at 1374-75, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-09. 
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today’s world may be misleading.  For example, a 30-second spot 
commercial shown during a Super Bowl football game may cost a 
vast sum, but the expenditure may have little if any impact on how 
the public reacts to the commercial message.108 
Thus, the court clearly has signaled that presentation of raw sales and 
advertising figures, which were sufficient to demonstrate the fame of 
Bose’s marks in this case, may not be enough to prevail in a different 
context. 
Second, the court analyzed whether the marks at issue possessed 
fame distinct from the famous BOSE house mark with which 
ACOUSTIC WAVE and WAVE frequently are coupled.  Earlier, the 
Board concluded that “[a]bsent additional evidence regarding the 
nature and extent of promotion or consumer perception of the 
marks WAVE and ACOUSTIC WAVE apart from the admittedly 
famous BOSE mark, we cannot conclude that this evidence 
establishes the fame of these pleaded marks.”109  Once again, the 
Federal Circuit disagreed with but was sympathetic to the Board’s 
finding.  Noting that “the issue of fame for product marks that travel 
with famous house marks is new to this court,”110 the court did not 
“fault the Board for its insistence that Bose produce evidence that the 
product marks can properly be seen as independent of the famous 
house marks.”111  The court found “overwhelming evidence of the 
independent trademark significance of the product marks”112 in the 
form of advertising and sales literature and third-party reviews of the 
products which “decouple[s] the product marks from the famous 
house marks.”113  Accordingly, the court held that the fame of the 
product marks stand apart from Bose’s house marks, and therefore 
should be afforded protection.114 
Turning to another DuPont factor, the court found that the Board 
erred by concluding that the parties’ goods were unrelated.  The 
Board had concluded that QSC’s application “identified component 
parts, ‘amplifiers and power amplifiers,’ while the Bose . . . marks are 
registered and used for stand-alone systems.”115  Agreeing with the 
Board that the products were not identical, the court held, however, 
that a “conclusion of relatedness is inescapable.”116  Bose’s registration 
                                                          
 108. Id. at 1375, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 109. Id. at 1374, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308 (internal quotes omitted). 
 110. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308. 
 111. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308. 
 112. Id. at 1375, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 113. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-09. 
 114. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 115. Id. at 1376, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 116. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
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describes its product “as including an amplifier,” and “consumers 
who purchase the Bose product cannot ignore the fact that it, like the 
QSC product, amplifies via an amplifier.”117  Thus, in contrast to the 
Board, the court determined that the factor of relatedness weighed in 
favor of a likelihood of confusion. 
The court also disagreed with the Board’s analysis of the similarity 
or dissimilarity of the marks.  The Board believed that the term 
POWER in QSC’s mark POWERWAVE “leads to a different 
connotation, as well as a different appearance, than either of 
opposer’s marks.”118  But, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he 
presence of the root element WAVE . . . introduces a strong similarity 
in all three marks.”119  Moreover, the court found that “[w]hatever 
additional distinction may be introduced by the element POWER . . . 
is severely limited by the fact that the mark is applied to acoustic 
equipment.”120  Based on these rulings, the court reversed the Board’s 
decision and denied QSC’s registration of the POWERWAVE mark.121 
5. Thompson v. Haynes 
The Federal Circuit returned to the issue of confusion one more 
time on September 30, 2002, albeit in a different context.  In 
Thompson v. Haynes,122 the court reviewed a decision of U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma123 involving claims 
under the Lanham Act,124 among other things.125 
                                                          
 117. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310. 
 118. Id. at 1377-78, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 119. Id. at 1378, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 120. Id., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 121. The court also addressed the DuPont factor relating to the similarity of trade 
channels. Id. at 1377, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310.  The court agreed with the 
Board’s ruling that this factor leaned in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion 
based upon the lack of language limiting channels of trade in QSC’s application.  Id., 
63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311. 
 122. 305 F.3d 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 123. The Federal Circuit enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of decisions 
involving claims arising under the federal patent laws.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) 
(1982).  In cases involving both patent and non-patent claims, appeals relating to the 
non-patent issues may also fall within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Boser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 909, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 124. See  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (prohibiting the false or misleading 
representation of a fact that is likely to cause confusion with respect tot the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of any goods or services).  
 125. The case initially was brought by Thompson seeking a declaration of patent 
non-infringement, and recovery of unpaid royalties.  Thompson, 305 F.3d at 1372, 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.  Fluid Controls responded with counterclaims under the 
patent laws, as well as for violations of the Lanham Act.  Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1652. 
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Thompson involved the sale of “fluid conducting swivel devices” that 
were manufactured and distributed under a patent royalty agreement 
between Earl E. Thompson, Fluid Controls, Inc. (“Fluid Controls”), 
and Fluid Controls’ president Henry T. Haynes.126  At first, Thompson 
acted as the distributor of swivels manufactured by Fluid Controls.127  
Following disputes between the parties concerning royalties, 
Thompson began to produce and sell his own swivels.128 
Before selling his own swivels, Thompson applied the designation 
“SW-343” on Fluid Controls’ swivels that he distributed.129  
Subsequently, upon receiving an order for swivels from a prior Fluid 
Controls customer, Thompson supplied his own swivels, which bore 
the designation “SW-343-D.”130  When Thompson’s customer then 
had trouble installing Thompson’s swivels, the customer contacted 
Fluid Controls for assistance.131 
Fluid Controls claimed that Thompson’s actions amounted to a 
violation of Section 43 of the Lanham Act.132  Finding that 
Thompson’s substitution of swivels created a likelihood of confusion, 
the district court found that Thompson’s acts “constituted a false 
designation of origin, a false or misleading description of fact, and a 
false or misleading misrepresentation of fact in violation of Section 
43 of the Lanham Act.”133 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding with 
respect to Lanham Act liability.134  To do so, the Federal Circuit 
applied Tenth Circuit law.135  To determine whether a likelihood of 
confusion exists, the Tenth Circuit, like the Federal Circuit, applies a 
series of factors.136  Except for the factor relating to the degree of care 
                                                          
 126. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 127. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 128. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 129. Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 130. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 131. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 132. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 133. Id. at 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656 (internal quotations omitted). 
 134. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.  The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the 
district court’s treatment of damages. 
 135. When reviewing patent issues, the Federal Circuit applies its own law, “but 
with respect to nonpatent issues [it] generally appl[ies] the law of the circuit in 
which the district court sits.”  Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 
1356, 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 136. The factors considered in the Tenth Circuit to analyze the existence of a 
likelihood of confusion are:  (i) the degree of similarity between the marks; (ii) the 
strength or weakness of the plaintiff’s mark; (iii) the intent of the alleged infringer in 
adopting its mark; (iv) the similarities and differences of the parties’ goods, services 
and marketing strategies; (v) the degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers 
of the goods or services involved; and (vi) evidence of actual confusion, if any.  
Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 
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exercised by consumers, the district court found, and the Federal 
Circuit agreed, that the “factors all support a finding of likelihood of 
confusion.”137 
The court deemed Fluid Controls’ evidence of actual confusion 
particularly important to the establishment of a likelihood of 
confusion.138  Fluid Controls’ evidence established that “a 
representative of the consumer of the swivels, made an ‘incorrect 
mental association between the involved . . . producers’”139 when he 
contacted Fluid Controls about swivels made by Thompson.140 
While it affirmed the district court’s finding that a likelihood of 
confusion existed and thus a violation of the Lanham Act occurred, 
the Federal Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s treatment of 
damages.141  The trial court added Thompson’s profits, Fluid 
Controls’ lost sales, and Fluid Controls’ costs to run corrective 
advertising, and awarded three times the sum to Fluid Controls.142  
The Federal Circuit held that such an award is not authorized by 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(a), which sets out damage provisions for violations of 
the Lanham Act.143 
The Federal Circuit explained that the statute requires that 
damages and profits be treated as separate issues.144  Courts are 
permitted to award treble damages, but are disallowed from awarding 
three times the proven profit amount.145  Rather, in terms of profits, 
“the court is constrained to award the amount proved, subject only to 
an adjustment, up or down, where the recovery would be otherwise 
unjust.”146  Although it could be argued that the trebling of profits by 
the district court was such a permissible adjustment, the Federal 
Circuit made clear that “[t]he court may not, as it did here, simply 
lump profits together with damages and apply the same measure of 
enhancement to both.”147  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed 
and remanded for further consideration the damage award.148 
                                                          
1483 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 137. Thompson, 305 F.3d at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 138. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 139. Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 140. See id. at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (stating that after Fluid Controls 
presented this evidence, Thompson bore the burden of rebutting this demonstration 
of actual confusion). 
 141. Id. at 1378, 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656-57. 
 142. Id. at 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 143. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 144. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 145. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 146. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 147. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 148. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
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B. Functionality:  Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp. 
In Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp.,149 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the issue of functionality.150  Generally, the law has long 
provided that product designs that are functional cannot serve as 
trademarks.  As the Supreme Court has explained: 
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to 
promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from 
instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to 
control a useful product feature.  It is the province of patent law, 
not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a 
monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited 
time.151 
Thus, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor established a series of factors, 
the “Morton-Norwich factors,” to assess whether a particular product 
feature is functional, and hence unable to serve as a mark.152 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has addressed the issue of 
functionality, most recently in the 2001 case TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. 
Marketing Displays, Inc.153  Valu Engineering presented the Federal 
Circuit with an opportunity to rule on whether the Supreme Court’s 
recent holding in TrafFix changed the Morton-Norwich factors for 
determining functionality.154  The case also presented an issue of first 
impression, for both the Board and the Federal Circuit, relating to 
whether the analysis of functionality properly may focus on a single 
narrow use for the design at issue, as opposed to the full range of uses 
that may be made of that design.155 
Valu Engineering, Inc. (“Valu”), a producer of conveyors, filed 
three applications in 1993 seeking to register as trademarks “conveyer 
guide rail configurations in ROUND, FLAT and TEE cross-sectional 
designs.”156  Valu’s application indicated that the applied-for marks 
                                                          
 149. 278 F.3d 1268, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 150. Id. at 1273, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426. 
 151. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1161, 1163 (1995). 
 152. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41, 213 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 9, 15-16 (C.C.P.A. 1982).  The Morton-Norwich factors are:  (i) the existence 
of a utility patent disclosing the design’s utilitarian benefits; (ii) advertising materials 
in which the design’s creator promotes the design’s utilitarian benefits; (iii) the 
availability to competitors of functionally equivalent designs; and (iv) facts indicating 
that the design yields a relatively uncomplicated and low cost way of manufacturing 
the product.  Id., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 15-16. 
 153. 532 U.S. 23, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (2001). 
 154. Valu Eng’g, 278 F.3d at 1274, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 155. Id. at 1277, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 156. Id. at 1271, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423.  “Conveyer guide rails are rails 
positioned along the length of the sides of a conveyor to keep containers or objects 
that are traveling on the conveyor from falling off the conveyor.”  Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 
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were used in connection with “Conveyor Guide Rails.”157  Rexnord 
Corporation (“Rexnord”) filed oppositions to Valu’s applications on 
the ground that the subject designs were functional.158  The Board 
sustained Rexnord’s opposition.159 
Before turning to the issue of first impression, the court analyzed 
whether the manner in which the Board had applied the Morton-
Norwich factors was rendered inappropriate by TrafFix.160  Of concern 
was the third factor, relating to the availability to competitors of 
functionally equivalent designs.161  In TrafFix, the Supreme Court 
found that a dual-spring feature of a traffic sign stand for which a 
party had sought trade dress protection was functional.162  Reaching 
this conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected rulings of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that the “appropriate question is 
whether the particular product configuration is a competitive 
necessity,”163 and thus “[e]xclusive use of a feature must ‘put 
competitors at a significant non-reputation related disadvantage’ 
before trade dress protection is denied on functionality grounds.”164  
Instead, the Supreme Court applied the “traditional” rule that “a 
product feature is functional . . . if it is essential to the use or purpose 
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”165  The 
Supreme Court also instructed that, once a product is found to be 
functional under the traditional rule, “there is no need to proceed 
further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the 
feature,”166 and, therefore, “no need . . . to engage . . . in speculation 
about other design possibilities.”167 
In Valu Engineering, the Federal Circuit considered whether that 
pronouncement by the Supreme Court rendered unnecessary the 
                                                          
(BNA) at 1423. 
 157. Id. at 1271-72, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 158. Id. at 1271, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 159. Id. at 1272, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424. 
 160. Id. at 1276, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 161. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 162. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1001 (2001). 
 163. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1335, 1343 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 164. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. 
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (1995)). 
 165. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (quoting Inwood 
Labs., Inc. v. Inves Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 n.10 
(1982) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 166. Id. at 33, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 167. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
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Morton-Norwich factor addressing availability of equivalent designs.168  
The Federal Circuit concluded that it did not, explaining that: 
Nothing in TrafFix suggests that consideration of alternative 
designs is not properly part of the overall mix, and we do not read 
the Court’s observations in TrafFix as rendering the availability of 
alternative designs irrelevant.  Rather, we conclude that the Court 
merely noted that once a product feature is found functional based 
on other considerations, there is no need to consider the 
availability of alternative designs, because the feature cannot be 
given trade dress protection merely because there are alternative 
designs available.169 
According to the Federal Circuit, this “does not mean that the 
availability of alternative designs cannot be a legitimate source of 
evidence to determine whether a feature is functional in the first 
place.”170  Thus, the Federal Circuit stated that it “do[es] not 
understand the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix to have altered 
the Morton-Norwich analysis.”171 
The Federal Circuit next turned to the main issue in Valu 
Engineering of whether the Board incorrectly narrowed its scope to a 
single application of the designs at issue.172  Valu Engineering’s 
designs were cross-sections of conveyer belt guide rails.173  As the 
court explained, “the Board focused primarily on the utilitarian 
advantages of Valu’s designs in a particular, competitively-significant 
application, namely, as they are used in the wet areas of bottling and 
canning plants.”174  The Board had limited its analysis to this specific 
application instead of taking into account all potential uses for Valu 
Engineering’s designs.175 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board’s approach, and 
concluded that “[r]equiring the Board to review the ‘entire universe’ 
of potential uses of a contested mark in the recited identification of 
goods would seriously undermine the goals of the functionality 
doctrine.”176  Rather, the court found that when a design is functional 
in just “a single competitively significant application,” the design 
must be considered functional and may not be protected as a mark 
                                                          
 168. Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 169. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 170. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 171. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 172. Id. at 1276-77, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 173. Id. at 1271, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423. 
 174. Id. at 1277, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 175. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427. 
 176. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
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“even if there is no anticompetitive effect in any other areas of use.”177  
The rationale for the court’s conclusion was that, irrespective of how 
many areas exist in which the design may be utilized in a non-
functional way, once there is a single significant area in which the 
design is functional, protection of the design as a mark would confer 
a monopoly over a useful product feature—something that is the 
province of the patent laws.178  Accordingly, the court held that the 
Board’s decision to limit its functionality analysis to the wet area of 
plants while ignoring all other actual or potential uses of the design 
was permissible.179 
C. Priority:  Herbko International v. Kappa Books, Inc. 
In Herbko International v. Kappa Books, Inc.180 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the issue of priority of use of a mark.  Generally, the party 
that makes first use of a mark in commerce enjoys prior rights over 
parties that subsequently adopt the same mark for use with the same 
or related goods or services.181  Herbko presented the court with an 
opportunity to consider application of the general rule of priority in 
the context of book titles.  Herbko involved a cancellation proceeding 
in which the Board granted summary judgment canceling Herbko 
International, Inc.’s (“Herbko”) registration for the mark 
CROSSWORD COMPANION on the basis that Kappa Books, Inc. 
(“Kappa”) had shown prior use of that mark as a title of a book.182  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s grant of summary 
judgment.183 
Herbko filed an intent-to-use application in June 1994 seeking to 
register the mark CROSSWORD COMPANION and design in 
connection with a “crossword puzzle system, namely paper crossword 
puzzle rolls and hand held puzzle roll scrolling device sold as a unit 
and crossword puzzle replacement rolls sold separately.”184  Herbko’s 
application subsequently ripened into a registration based upon a 
declaration of September 22, 1994 as the date of first use in 
                                                          
 177. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 178. Id., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428. 
 179. Id. at 1279, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429. 
 180. 308 F.3d 1156, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 181. See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (stating that “[t]he 
trademark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence 
as the distinctive symbol of the party using it . . . [i]t is simply founded on priority of 
appropriation.”). 
 182. Herbko Int’l, 308 F.3d  at 1159-60, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376.  
 183. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381. 
 184. Id. at 1160, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
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commerce.185  In June 1997, Kappa filed a petition seeking the 
cancellation of Herbko’s registration on the grounds that Kappa had 
made prior use of the CROSSWORD COMPANION mark, and 
Herbko’s subsequent use was likely to cause confusion.186  The Board 
found no questions of fact concerning either priority of use or the 
likelihood of confusion, and granted summary judgment to Kappa.187  
The basis for the Board’s decision was that, in 1993, Kappa sold over 
one million copies of a crossword puzzle book under the name 
CROSSWORD COMPANION.188  Kappa published a second volume 
of the book in 1995, and sold over 900,000 CROSSWORD 
COMPANION books from 1995 to 1997.189  However, Kappa made 
“no significant sales” of the books in 1994.190 
To establish priority, a party “must show proprietary rights in the 
mark that produce a likelihood of confusion.”191  As the Federal 
Circuit explained, “[t]hese proprietary rights may arise from a prior 
registration, prior trademark or service mark use, prior use as a trade 
name,  prior use analogous to trademark or service mark use, or any 
other use sufficient to establish proprietary rights.”192  Rejecting the 
Board’s decision in Herbko, the court determined that Kappa’s prior 
use of the CROSSWORD COMPANION title did not amount to any 
use from which proprietary rights may arise. 
Rather, as stated by the court, “[b]efore a prior use becomes an 
analogous use sufficient to create proprietary rights, the petitioner 
must show prior use sufficient to create an association in the minds of the 
purchasing public between the mark and the petitioner’s goods.”193  
The court interpreted its own precedent in declaring that “the 
publication of a single book cannot create, as a matter of law, an 
association between the book’s title (the alleged mark) and the 
source of the book (the publisher).”194  The combination of these two 
principles compelled the court to find that Kappa’s use of the 
CROSSWORD COMPANION title in 1993 did not establish priority 
over Herbko’s 1994 intent-to-use application. 
In overturning the Board’s decision, the court rejected the Board’s 
finding that when Kappa produced its second CROSSWORD 
                                                          
 185. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 186. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 187. Id. at 1160-61, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 188. Id. at 1160, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 189. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 190. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 191. Id. at 1162, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378. 
 192. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378. 
 193. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (emphasis added). 
 194. Id. at 1163, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (emphasis added). 
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COMPANION book in 1995, it “perfected” the use that had begun 
with publication of the first volume in 1993.195  Instead, the court 
explained that: 
If a later party uses or applies for a trademark before the creation 
of a series (i.e., before the publication of a second volume), the 
proprietary rights for the series title date back to the first volume of 
the series only if the second volume is published within a 
reasonable time with a requisite association in the public mind.  
That association requires more than publication of a single book.196 
Since Kappa failed to prove publication of a second volume prior to 
Herbko’s 1994 intent-to-use application, the court determined that 
the Board erred in its conclusion that Kappa possessed priority to the 
mark.197  Accordingly, the court reversed the cancellation of Herbko’s 
mark. 
D. Descriptiveness 
In May 2002, the Federal Circuit twice examined the issue of 
descriptiveness.198  Generally, a mark is not entitled to protection and 
may not be registered if the mark “is merely descriptive” of the goods 
or services in connection with which it is used unless it can be shown 
that the mark has developed secondary meaning.199 
                                                          
 195. Id. at 1162, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379. 
 196. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378-79 (emphasis added). 
 197. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.  The court also reviewed and agreed with 
the Board’s determination that “Herbko’s CROSSWORD COMPANION mark is 
sufficiently similar to Kappa’s mark, when applied to the goods at issue, that 
purchasers would likely believe those goods were associated with a single source.” Id. 
at 1166, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.  The court’s ruling with respect to priority, 
however, compelled reversal of the grant of summary judgment for Kappa. Id., 64 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381. 
 198. In re Galbreath, No. 01-1620, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9702 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 
2002); Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 209 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 199. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2000).  The statute provides:   
[n]o trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished 
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal 
register on account of its nature unless it:  [c]onsists of a mark which 
(1) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is 
merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, (2) when used on 
or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically 
descriptive of them, except as indications of regional origin may be 
registrable under section 1054 of this title, (3) when used on or in 
connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive of them, (4) is primarily merely a surname, or 
(5) comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional.  
Id.  See also In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1564, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that “[a] merely descriptive mark qualifies 
for registration only if the applicant shows that it has acquired secondary 
meaning.”) (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 
(1992)). 
FINALTRADEMARKSUMMARY.DOC 8/15/2003  1:44 PM 
1022 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:999 
1. In re Galbreath 
The Federal Circuit first addressed descriptiveness in In re 
Galbreath, an unpublished decision issued on May 9, 2002.200  In 
Galbreath, the court affirmed the Board’s refusal to register the mark 
SAFE-T-BUCKLE applied for by John A. Galbreath (“Galbreath”) for 
use in connection with “plastic buckle fasteners for use in child 
strollers, high chairs, child carriers, changing stations, shopping cart 
restraint systems and similar articles.”201  The Board found 
Galbreath’s mark merely descriptive of his products.202 
The Federal Circuit agreed, indicating that “[a] mark qualifies for 
registration if it ‘requires imagination, thought and perception to 
arrive at the qualities or characteristics of the goods.’”203  In contrast, 
the court found that Galbreath’s mark “immediately describes a safety 
buckle”—the relevant goods.204 
The court was not swayed by Galbreath’s identification of other 
marks with the prefix “Safe-T” that had been approved and 
registered, such as “Safe-T-Belt” for back braces and “Safe-T-Strap” for 
support lines for construction workers.205  Rather, the court instructed 
that “[t]he Patent and Trademark Office must decide each case on its 
own merits; and third party registrations of other marks using the 
same terms do not conclusively rebut a finding of descriptiveness.”206  
Distinguishing the third-party marks identified by Galbreath, the 
court found that those marks “do not immediately describe the 
relevant goods, but are suggestive and require a mental step to relate 
the marks to the goods.”207  In contrast, the court found that by 
consulting the dictionary definitions of “safety” and “buckle,” it was 
clear that Galbreath’s mark “immediately convey[s] to the public that 
the product is a fastener used for safety purposes.”208  Accordingly, the 
court agreed with the Board’s decision affirming the Patent and 
Trademark Office’s refusal to register SAFE-T-BUCKLE. 
2. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc. 
The Federal Circuit briefly turned its attention again to the issue of 
descriptiveness on May 21, 2002, when it issued an opinion in 
                                                          
 200. Galbreath, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9702, at *1. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at *2. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id.  
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Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc.,209 an appeal from a decision 
of the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.210  In 
this case, Transclean Corporation (“Transclean”) alleged patent and 
trademark infringement claims against Bridgewood Services, Inc. 
(“Bridgewood”) arising in connection with Bridgewood’s sales of a 
device for changing automatic transmission fluid.211  Transclean 
claimed that Bridgewood infringed Transclean’s unregistered marks 
TOTAL FLUID EXCHANGE and TOTAL FLUID X CHANGE.212 
The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement 
against Transclean on the ground that Transclean had not 
established protectable rights in the marks, specifically “that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact relating to Transclean’s actual 
usage of the marks in commerce.”213  Reviewing the lower court’s 
decision, the Federal Circuit agreed that “Transclean failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to nondescriptive usage of the mark 
on the goods.”214  As the court explained, in order to be eligible for 
protection, “the usage of the marks must be as a source identifier 
rather than a description of the goods’ qualities.”215  The record on 
appeal showed that Transclean’s marks “were used in a purely 
descriptive manner, e.g., ‘TFX TOTAL FLUID EXCHANGE SYSTEM 
FOR AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSIONS by Transclean Corp.’”216  
Accordingly, because the marks asserted by Transclean were merely 
descriptive, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s summary 
judgment of non-infringement.217 
                                                          
 209. 290 F.3d 1364, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 210. See Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. 
Minn. 1999) (holding that plaintiff did not hold a protected  trademark), aff’d in part 
and vacated in part, 290 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 211. Transclean, 290 F.3d at 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 212. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 213. Id. at 1380, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 214. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 215. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 216. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877. 
 217. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.  In addition, the Federal Circuit affirmed 
dismissal of Transclean’s trademark infringement claims on the alternate ground 
that Transclean’s marks had not been used in commerce because the marks were not 
affixed to Transclean’s goods.  Applying Eighth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit 
indicated that “[u]se of the mark on documents does not satisfy the usage 
requirement when the mark can be affixed to the goods themselves.” Id., 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.  Transclean had not affixed the marks to its goods.  Id., 
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
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II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
A. Choice of Law:  Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc. 
In Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc.,218 the Federal Circuit determined 
which law the district court should have applied to an assertion of 
trademark infringement.  The United States District Court for the 
Central District of California, as well as the parties, “presumed that 
Federal Circuit law regarding bad faith governs [the party’s] 
assertions of trademark infringement.”219  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed. 
Golan involved a dispute between Ilan Golan and Pingel Enterprise, 
Inc. (“Pingel”), both of whom manufactured after-market products 
for motorcycles including a type of fuel valve known as a “petcock.”220  
In October 1998, after Golan began advertising its petcocks, Pingel’s 
attorney sent a cease and desist letter asserting that Golan’s 
production and sales of petcocks under the mark PEAK FLOW 
infringed various of Pingel’s patents as well as Pingel’s POWER-FLO 
mark for petcocks.221  Pingel also sent letters to its own distributors to 
“alert” them that Pingel was taking “immediate action to halt the sale 
and production” of Golan’s petcock because it “infringes patents and 
a trademark held by Pingel.”222  Five months later, Golan brought suit 
seeking declarations of non-infringement of the patents and 
trademark at issue.223  Golan also asserted antitrust  claims and unfair 
competition claims based upon Pingel’s communications to 
distributors about the alleged infringing nature of Golan’s 
products.224  Pingel counterclaimed for infringement of its POWER-
FLO mark.225 
The district court resolved all of the parties’ claims—except for the 
trademark infringement claims—on summary judgment.226  The 
parties subsequently stipulated to dismissal without prejudice Golan’s 
motion for declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Pingel’s 
trademark, as well as Pingel’s trademark counterclaims.227  
Nevertheless, issues of trademark law were addressed on appeal in the 
                                                          
 218. 310 F.3d 1360, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 219. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920. 
 220. Id. at 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 221. Id. at 1363-64, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 222. Id. at 1364, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 223. Id. at 1365, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 224. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913-14. 
 225. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. 
 226. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. 
 227. Id. at 1366 n.3, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 n.3. 
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analysis of Golan’s claim for unfair competition based on Pingel’s 
statements to distributors.  The district court ruled that those 
statements were not actionable “because Golan provided insufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption that Pingel made the claims 
[concerning alleged infringements by Golan] in good faith.”228 
In reaching that determination, the district court applied Federal 
Circuit trademark law.229  On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected 
application of its own law.  Instead, the Federal Circuit reiterated the 
well-established rule that “[t]he law of the pertinent regional circuit 
governs the assertion of federally protected trademark rights.”230  The 
appellate court further explained,  
If, however, Pingel had not federally registered the Power-Flo mark 
at the time he asserted infringement, the asserted trademark rights 
are entirely the creature of state or common law.  If that is the case, 
no federal statute preempts or affects the remaining state claims.  
Rather, Ninth Circuit law applies to the federal Lanham Act claims 
predicated on the assertion of state trademark rights, and state law 
applies entirely to the California unfair competition and business 
tort claims predicated on the assertion of state trademark rights.231 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit “remand[ed] to the district court to 
ascertain the proper application of law with respect to the trademark 
infringement issues.”232 
B. Timeliness of Appeal:  Boyle v. Barclays Global Investors, N.A. 
In Boyle v. Barclays Global Investors, N.A.,233 an unpublished decision, 
the Federal Circuit briefly addressed the timeliness of a notice of 
appeal.  In this case, John C. Boyle sought to appeal from a decision 
of the Board that was issued on November 1, 2001.  As the Federal 
Circuit explained, “[a]n appeal from a decision of the Board must be 
filed with the PTO within two months of the date of the Board’s 
decision.  In this case, the notice of appeal was due by January 2, 
2002.”234  Although the appellant stated that “he mailed a notice of 
appeal to the court on November 30, 2001 and again on January 3, 
2002,”235 the “PTO received Boyle’s notice of appeal on January 7, 
                                                          
 228. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. 
 229. Id. at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920. 
 230. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 
F.3d 1308, 1326, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 231. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920. 
 232. Id. at 1374, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920. 
 233. No. 02-1357, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 24098 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2002). 
 234. Id. at *1. 
 235. Id. 
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2002.”236  Because the PTO received the notice of appeal more than 
two months after the date of the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit 
dismissed Boyle’s appeal for being untimely.237 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s 2002 opinions did not present any sweeping 
new interpretations or applications of trademark law.  Rather, the 
court’s decisions continued to apply, and modestly refine, preexisting 
principles.  Substantive issues predominated over procedural issues in 
trademark cases addressed by the Federal Circuit in 2002.  In five 
different cases, the Federal Circuit addressed issues relating to 
whether a likelihood of confusion was demonstrated.  Other 
substantive trademark issues addressed by the Federal Circuit in 2002 
included functionality and priority of use.  Although the 2002 
trademark cases addressed by the Federal Circuit do not represent 
any shifts in the law, the cases do provide insight into the Federal 
Circuit’s approach to trademark law. 
                                                          
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
